Interim measures in Arbitration

INTERIM MEASURES IN ARBITRATION

A Comparative Analysis of

Section 9 and Section 17

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(As Amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Acts of 2015 and 2019)

R. GOPALAKANNAN B.A., B.L.,

Advocate & Panel Counsel

Supreme Court of India | Madras High Court | Delhi High Court

New Delhi & Chennai

June 2026

Abstract

The grant of interim relief is among the most consequential exercises of judicial and arbitral power. It determines whether a party's rights and assets survive intact until the final award is rendered — or are eroded, dissipated, or rendered unenforceable in the interval. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('the Act') provides two distinct but complementary avenues for securing such relief: Section 9, which empowers a court of competent jurisdiction to grant interim measures, and Section 17, which vests corresponding power in the arbitral tribunal itself. This article traces the legislative history, substantive contours, and interpretive evolution of both provisions, examines their interplay through the lens of leading Supreme Court and High Court decisions, and offers practitioners a framework for choosing the optimal route to relief in any given dispute.

I.  Introduction

Arbitration, as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, draws its efficacy not merely from the finality of the award but equally from the preservation of the status quo — the safeguarding of assets, evidence, and contractual arrangements — during the pendency of proceedings. An award, however perfectly reasoned, is rendered hollow if the subject matter of the dispute has been squandered, the assets dissipated, or a third party has been inducted into possession by the time the tribunal reaches its verdict.

This is the domain of interim measures — provisional orders issued to maintain or restore a position, prevent irreparable harm, or preserve evidence until the dispute is finally adjudicated. Internationally, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006 version) devotes an entire Chapter IV-A to interim measures and preliminary orders, recognising their centrality to the arbitral process. The Indian statute, modelled on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, has evolved considerably through the 2015 and 2019 Amendments to assign concurrent but differentiated roles to courts and tribunals.

Section 9 and Section 17 of the Act are the twin pillars of this architecture. Section 9 is the court's jurisdiction — wide, coercive, and enforceable as a decree. Section 17 is the tribunal's jurisdiction — evolving from a 'toothless' provision pre-2015 to one that is 'as comprehensive as Section 9' post-amendment. Together, they constitute a complete interim relief framework, calibrated to balance party autonomy with judicial oversight.

II.  Legislative Framework and Historical Evolution

A.  The Original Act of 1996

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and to define the law relating to conciliation. The Act substantially adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law (1985).

In its original form, Section 9 conferred wide powers on courts to grant interim measures before, during, and after arbitral proceedings. Section 17, however, was a comparatively circumscribed provision: the arbitral tribunal could order a party to take interim protective measures in respect of the subject matter of the dispute, but — crucially — such orders were not directly enforceable as orders of a court. A party seeking enforcement of a Section 17 order had to approach a court under Section 27, applying for execution, which added delay and procedural complexity.

B.  The 2015 Amendment: Transforming Section 17

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — which came into force on 23 October 2015 — made several path-breaking changes. Most significant for our purposes:

• Section 17 was comprehensively substituted. The amended Section 17(1) now empowers the tribunal to pass the same range of interim measures as a court under Section 9(1), including appointment of guardian, preservation of property, interim injunction, and appointment of receiver.
• Section 17(2) was inserted: orders of the arbitral tribunal under Section 17 shall be deemed to be orders of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as orders of the Court. This was transformative — tribunal orders now carried the force of court orders, without the need to seek a separate court order for enforcement.
• Section 9 was simultaneously amended by inserting Section 9(3): once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, a court shall not entertain an application for interim measures under Section 9, unless the court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy under Section 17 efficacious.

C.  The 2019 Amendment: Institutional Arbitration

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 introduced the concept of the Arbitration Council of India and made further refinements, but left the Section 9 / Section 17 framework broadly intact. The emphasis shifted towards encouraging institutional arbitration and expedited proceedings under Section 29B.

III.  Section 9: Court's Power to Grant Interim Measures

A.  Statutory Text and Scope

B.  Temporal Scope: Before, During, and After

Section 9 uniquely spans three temporal windows that no other provision covers in its entirety:

• Before arbitral proceedings: A party may seek interim relief even before a Notice of Arbitration is issued or an arbitral tribunal is constituted. This is particularly significant in emergency situations where assets are being dissipated or evidence is at risk of destruction.
• During arbitral proceedings: This is the concurrent window that overlaps with Section 17 — though post-2015, Section 9(3) now creates a strong preference for Section 17 relief once the tribunal is constituted.
• After the award but before enforcement: A party may seek protective measures to prevent frustration of the award during the period between pronouncement and execution under Section 36.

C.  Standards Governing Grant of Relief

Section 9 does not codify the legal standards for granting relief. Courts have, by consistent judicial construction, applied the principles governing Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

1. Prima facie case: The applicant must demonstrate a prima facie case on merits — not a final decision on merits, but a case that is bona fide and not frivolous.
2. Balance of convenience: The court must assess where the balance of convenience lies — whether the inconvenience of granting the injunction outweighs that of refusing it.
3. Irreparable harm: The applicant must show that in the absence of the order, it would suffer irreparable injury that cannot be adequately compensated in damages.
4. Conduct of the parties: Delay in approaching the court, suppression of facts, or unconscionable conduct may disentitle an applicant to discretionary relief.

The Supreme Court in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975, UK) and its Indian counterparts — principally Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719 — have laid down these principles as the bedrock of interim injunction jurisprudence, and they apply with full force under Section 9.

D.  Section 9(3): The Primacy of Section 17 Post-2015

This sub-section represents a deliberate legislative choice to channel interim relief applications to the tribunal once it is constituted, thereby reducing judicial interference and promoting arbitral autonomy — a core objective of the 2015 Amendment. It creates a rebuttable presumption that Section 17 provides adequate relief. The applicant must discharge the burden of demonstrating 'inefficacy' of Section 17, which the courts have broadly interpreted to mean situations where:

• The tribunal has not yet been constituted and expedited relief is needed.
• The subject matter is outside the tribunal's enforcement jurisdiction (e.g., third-party assets).
• There is a risk that the tribunal's order may not be enforceable against a recalcitrant party.
• One party refuses to participate in the arbitral process, rendering Section 17 illusory.

E.  Territorial Jurisdiction of the Court

The 'court' for purposes of Section 9 is defined in Section 2(1)(e) as the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district (including the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction). The 2015 Amendment introduced Section 2(2) read with the Explanation thereto, clarifying that Part I of the Act applies to international commercial arbitrations seated in India, and by the 2015 Amendment the First Schedule now specifies that for international commercial arbitration, only the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 9.

IV.  Section 17: The Arbitral Tribunal's Power to Grant Interim Measures

A.  Statutory Text (Post-2015)

B.  Scope: During Arbitral Proceedings

Unlike Section 9, which spans all three temporal windows, Section 17 is confined to the period 'during arbitral proceedings.' The phrase 'during arbitral proceedings' has been interpreted by courts to extend from the constitution of the tribunal until the rendering of the final award or the termination of proceedings under Section 32. Once the tribunal is functus officio, Section 17 cannot be invoked; the court's jurisdiction under Section 9 revives.

C.  Nature and Enforceability of Tribunal Orders

The critical innovation of the 2015 Amendment is Section 17(2). Prior to 2015, a tribunal's order under Section 17 was persuasive but not directly enforceable — a party defying it could only be brought to court under Section 27 (court assistance in taking evidence). Post-2015, a Section 17 order has the coercive force of a court order and can be enforced by contempt proceedings, attachment, and other execution measures under the CPC.

This change has dramatically altered the landscape: institutional arbitral tribunals, DIAC tribunals, SIAC emergency arbitrators, and ad hoc tribunals can now issue freezing orders, injunctions, and asset preservation orders that carry real teeth.

D.  Emergency Arbitration and Section 17

With the growing adoption of emergency arbitration provisions in institutional rules (ICC, SIAC, LCIA, DIAC), the question arose whether an emergency arbitrator's order falls within Section 17. The issue is contested. The 246th Law Commission Report recommended that emergency arbitration be explicitly recognised and emergency arbitrator orders be enforceable. While the 2019 Amendment did not expressly address this, leading courts have taken the view that where the parties have agreed to institutional rules that provide for emergency arbitration, the resulting order should be treated as a Section 17 order — particularly post the amended Section 17(2).

E.  Standards for Interim Measures Under Section 17

The arbitral tribunal applies the same tripartite test as courts under Section 9 — prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. However, the tribunal also considers:

• The potential harm to the applicant if the order is not granted versus harm to the respondent if it is granted.
• The likelihood that the applicant will succeed on the merits of the main claim.
• Whether adequate security has been provided by the applicant.
• The preservation and relevance of evidence to be secured.

V.  Comparative Analysis: Section 9 versus Section 17

VI.  Real-Life Scenarios and Illustrations

A.  Construction Dispute — Freezing of Bank Guarantee

Consider a public-private partnership infrastructure project between a highway developer (the 'Contractor') and a state authority (the 'Authority'). The Authority invokes a performance bank guarantee on alleged grounds of project delay, while the Contractor disputes the invocation as fraudulent and contrary to the contract. The arbitration clause requires institutional arbitration before a three-member tribunal.

Before the tribunal is constituted, the Contractor files a Section 9 petition before the High Court seeking an injunction restraining the bank from making payment under the guarantee. This is a classic pre-constitution Section 9 application. Once the tribunal is constituted, the Contractor approaches it under Section 17 seeking the same injunction pending the award. The tribunal, noting that the invocation is prima facie fraudulent based on contemporaneous correspondence, passes a Section 17 order restraining the Authority from receiving and appropriating the guarantee proceeds, with the bank holding the amount in a suspense account. This order, enforceable as a court order post-2015, prevents irreversible financial harm.

B.  Joint Venture Dispute — Preservation of Books and Documents

Two joint venture partners in a real estate development project fall out. One partner (the 'Exiting Partner') alleges misappropriation of funds by the Managing Partner and commences arbitration. Fearing that the Managing Partner will destroy financial records, the Exiting Partner approaches the arbitral tribunal under Section 17 for an order directing preservation and production of books of account, bank statements, site registers, and contractor payment records.

The tribunal — exercising powers under Section 17(1)(iv) read with Section 9(1)(iv) — passes an order for preservation and deposit of documents with a neutral custodian. This order effectively prevents evidence destruction and secures the evidentiary foundation of the arbitration.

C.  International Commercial Arbitration — Asset Preservation

An Indian software company ('Licensor') enters into a software licensing agreement with a foreign entity ('Licensee') providing for SIAC arbitration seated in Singapore. A dispute arises over non-payment of licence fees. The Licensor seeks emergency interim relief from the SIAC Emergency Arbitrator, who orders the Licensee to maintain a minimum balance in its Indian bank account pending the arbitration.

The Licensee, a company with assets in India, refuses to comply. The Licensor applies under Section 9 before the Bombay High Court (which has jurisdiction over the ICA since the High Court is the 'court' for Section 2(1)(e) in ICA matters). Relying on the Bhatia International doctrine as modified by BALCO, and the post-2015 position permitting Section 9 in ICA seated abroad, the Licensor secures a freezing order over the Licensee's Indian bank accounts.

D.  PMLA and Arbitration — Competing Jurisdictions

An infrastructure company's assets are attached by the Enforcement Directorate under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Separately, its joint venture partner commences arbitration over a contract dispute and seeks a Section 9 order for appointment of a receiver over those very assets. The intersection of PMLA attachment orders and civil/arbitral interim orders raises complex questions of precedence, which courts have resolved by holding that PMLA attachment proceedings are special statutory proceedings that ordinarily prevail over civil or arbitral interim orders.

E.  Dissipation of Assets — Mareva-type Order

A commodities trading company commences arbitration against a defaulting buyer for non-payment. The buyer has been transferring assets to subsidiaries and related parties. The aggrieved seller applies before the Court under Section 9 for a 'Mareva-type' freezing injunction — an injunction restraining the buyer from disposing of, transferring, or encumbering assets up to the disputed amount, pending the arbitral award. Indian courts have recognised and granted such Mareva-type orders under Section 9(1)(vi) — 'such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the court just and convenient' — following the Supreme Court's lead in Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese & Minerals (P) Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 125.

VII.  Analysis of Key Judgements

1.  Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105

The Supreme Court (Three-Judge Bench) held that Part I of the Act, including Section 9, applies to international commercial arbitrations held abroad, unless the parties expressly or impliedly excluded its application. This decision opened Indian courts to Section 9 applications even where the seat of arbitration was outside India, significantly expanding the court's role in supporting foreign-seated arbitrations. The ruling was subsequently read down by the Constitution Bench in BALCO (below).

2.  Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (BALCO), (2012) 9 SCC 552

The Constitution Bench (Five-Judge Bench) overruled Bhatia International prospectively and held that Part I of the Act applies only to arbitrations seated in India. Consequently, courts in India cannot entertain Section 9 applications in respect of arbitrations seated abroad, except to the extent of the 2015 Amendment, which inserted a proviso permitting Section 9 applications in foreign-seated ICA in certain circumstances. BALCO redrew the territorial boundary of Section 9 jurisdiction.

3.  Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja, (2004) 3 SCC 155

The Supreme Court held that a Section 9 application is maintainable even before arbitral proceedings are commenced, provided the applicant has a bona fide intention to commence arbitration. The Court clarified that the phrase 'before arbitral proceedings' does not require a prior Notice of Arbitration to be issued. This judgment is foundational to understanding the pre-constitution window under Section 9.

4.  Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese & Minerals (P) Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 125

The Supreme Court held that Section 9(1)(ii) does not limit the court's jurisdiction to only 'goods' — the broader phrase 'subject matter of the arbitration' covers all types of property, including immovable property and intangibles. This judgment also confirmed that courts exercising Section 9 jurisdiction have coextensive powers with those available under the CPC for granting interlocutory relief, including a 'Mareva-type' freezing injunction under Section 9(1)(vi).

5.  S. Rajan v. M/s. Nanjundamma, (2007) 3 Kant LJ 37

The Karnataka High Court held that while Section 9 empowers a court to appoint a receiver, such appointment must be based on a finding that the applicant has established a prima facie case and that without such appointment, the subject matter would be rendered nugatory. This decision reiterates that the discretion under Section 9 is not untrammeled but must be exercised judiciously.

6.  MD, Army Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd., (2004) 9 SCC 619

The Supreme Court emphasised that Section 9 does not give courts power to make orders of a substantive nature that would amount to granting the final relief itself through an interim application. The interim relief must be truly interim — protective in nature and not one that finally determines rights — failing which, it goes beyond the court's jurisdiction under Section 9.

7.  Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc., (2013) 1 SCC 641

The Supreme Court addressed the interface between multi-party agreements and arbitration, holding that non-signatories can be compelled to arbitrate in certain circumstances. The judgment has implications for Section 9 applications where interim relief is sought against non-signatories — the court must be satisfied that the respondent is covered by the arbitration agreement directly or derivatively.

8.  Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 712

A landmark post-2015 decision, the Supreme Court comprehensively examined the relationship between Section 9(3) and Section 17, holding that Section 9(3) manifests the legislative intent to restrict court intervention once the tribunal is constituted. The Court held that a party seeking Section 9 relief post-constitution must affirmatively demonstrate that the circumstances 'may not render the remedy under Section 17 efficacious.' Mere preference for a court's broader enforcement machinery does not suffice.

9.  Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Coupons Private Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 209

This landmark judgment arose from the Amazon-Future Group dispute and addressed, inter alia, the enforceability of an Emergency Arbitrator's (EA) award/order under SIAC Rules. The Supreme Court held that an EA order constitutes an 'order' of the arbitral tribunal within the meaning of Section 17(1) of the Act, and is thus enforceable as a court order under Section 17(2). This decision effectively brought emergency arbitration within the Section 17 framework, resolving a significant jurisprudential gap.

10.  NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 557

At the interim stage, the Supreme Court upheld the Emergency Arbitrator's order passed by the SIAC arbitrator restraining Future Retail from proceeding with the Reliance transaction, treating it as a Section 17 order enforceable under the Act. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court's order setting aside the Single Judge's enforcement of the EA order was reversed, confirming that emergency arbitral orders are maintainable and enforceable.

11.  Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2022) SCC OnLine Del 4240

The Delhi High Court, applying the principle in Arcelor Mittal, declined a Section 9 application on the ground that the arbitral tribunal was duly constituted and Section 17 was an efficacious remedy. The Court clarified that 'efficacy' is not to be tested by the applicant's preference but by an objective assessment of whether the tribunal can provide effective relief — which it ordinarily can in standard contractual disputes.

12.  Essar House Private Ltd. v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 423

The Supreme Court confirmed that the arbitral tribunal's power under Section 17, post-2015 Amendment, is coextensive with the court's power under Section 9, covering the full range of interim protective measures. The decision rejected the contention that certain categories of relief (such as appointment of receiver) were available only to courts and not to tribunals.

13.  Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481

The Bombay High Court, in a pre-2015 case, held that the test for granting interim measures under Section 9 is not as strict as that for granting a stay, but nonetheless requires the applicant to demonstrate that the award might be rendered infructuous. This standard was subsequently incorporated into the post-2015 framework through judicial synthesis.

14.  Jagdish Ahuja & Anr. v. Cupino Ltd. & Anr., 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 791

The Bombay High Court held that even after the constitution of the tribunal, a Section 9 application would be maintainable where the tribunal is unable to act — for example, where one arbitrator refuses to participate or where there is a deadlock in appointment — as this renders Section 17 relief 'inefficacious' within the meaning of Section 9(3).

VIII.  Practitioner's Guide: Choosing Between Section 9 and Section 17

A.  Pre-Constitution of Tribunal

At this stage, the only route is Section 9. The applicant must simultaneously issue a Notice of Arbitration (unless time exigencies preclude this) and file the Section 9 petition. Courts are empowered to grant even ex parte interim orders under Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC in extreme urgency. The applicant should prepare an affidavit establishing: (a) the arbitration agreement, (b) the existence of the dispute, (c) the risk of harm, (d) the prima facie case, and (e) balance of convenience.

B. Post-Constitution — Standard Case

Once the tribunal is constituted, Section 17 is the primary route. The application should be supported by the same evidence as a Section 9 petition. Practitioners should note that Section 17(2) now provides for direct enforcement without requiring a separate court application — the tribunal's signed order may be presented to the executing court directly.

C.  When to Use Section 9 Post-Constitution

Section 9 may be appropriate post-constitution where: (i) the relief is sought against a third party not amenable to the tribunal's jurisdiction; (ii) the arbitrator is an interested party and has declined to pass interim orders; (iii) the tribunal has been constituted under a defective appointment process and its authority is challenged; (iv) cross-border enforcement of assets requires orders from multiple courts and the tribunal's order may not be recognised abroad.

D.  Documentary Checklist

• Certified copy of the Arbitration Agreement (standalone or embedded in the contract)
• Notice of Arbitration / Demand for Arbitration served on the respondent
• Supporting affidavit verifying facts — to be sworn by an authorised representative
• Vakalatnama / Power of Attorney
• Evidence of the risk of harm / dissipation (bank statements, transfer records, correspondence)
• Balance sheet or asset schedule of the respondent (for freezing orders)
• Draft undertaking as to damages offered by the applicant

IX.  Recent Developments and the Road Ahead

The Supreme Court's decisions in Amazon/Future and Arcelor Mittal signal a maturing arbitration jurisprudence that respects party autonomy, reduces court dependency, and integrates international best practices. Several pending reforms deserve attention:

1. Recognition of Emergency Arbitration: The Law Commission's recommendation for an explicit statutory provision on emergency arbitrators remains unlegislated. A specific provision akin to Article 17B of the UNCITRAL Model Law would provide greater certainty.
2. Cross-Border Interim Relief: India has not acceded to any convention on cross-border enforcement of interim orders. A bilateral or multilateral framework would enhance the utility of both Section 9 and Section 17 in international disputes.
3. Time-Bound Disposal of Section 9 Applications: The 2015 Amendment sought to limit Section 9 applications to 90 days (akin to Section 29A for awards), but no express limitation is codified in Section 9 itself. Legislative clarity is needed.
4. Arbitration Council of India (ACI): When operationalised, the ACI's role in accrediting arbitral institutions will indirectly enhance the credibility and enforceability of Section 17 orders from accredited institutions.
5. AI and Technology in Arbitral Proceedings: The use of digital evidence preservation tools and online arbitration platforms requires updated procedural rules on what constitutes a valid Section 17 order in paperless proceedings.

X.  Conclusion

Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 form an interlocking but purposefully differentiated framework for interim relief in arbitral proceedings. Pre-2015, Section 9 was the dominant provision — wide, coercive, and comprehensively used — while Section 17 was a pale shadow. The 2015 Amendment dramatically recalibrated this balance by making Section 17 orders directly enforceable as court orders and by directing parties post-constitution to the tribunal as the primary forum for interim relief.

The post-2015 framework reflects a sophisticated legislative design: courts retain jurisdiction at the bookends of the process (pre-constitution and post-award), while the tribunal governs the middle — the core of the arbitral process. Section 9(3) acts as the pivot: once the tribunal is constituted, courts yield, unless the applicant demonstrates that Section 17 cannot provide an efficacious remedy.

For practitioners, the choice between Section 9 and Section 17 is not merely procedural — it is strategic. The speed of tribunal constitution, the nature of the relief sought, the identity of the respondent, and the enforceability of the order in domestic and cross-border contexts all bear on this choice. A thorough pre-application analysis — informed by the evolving case law surveyed in this article — is indispensable to effective interim relief strategy in modern Indian arbitration practice.

List of References

A.  Legislation

• Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act No. 26 of 1996)
• Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act No. 3 of 2016)
• Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act No. 33 of 2019)
• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2, 3; Section 151
• Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

B.  Supreme Court Decisions

1. Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105
2. Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (BALCO), (2012) 9 SCC 552
3. Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja, (2004) 3 SCC 155
4. Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese & Minerals (P) Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 125
5. MD, Army Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd., (2004) 9 SCC 619
6. Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc., (2013) 1 SCC 641
7. Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719
8. Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 712
9. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Coupons Private Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 209
10. NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 557
11. Essar House Private Ltd. v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 423

C.  High Court Decisions

• Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481 (Bombay High Court)
• Jagdish Ahuja & Anr. v. Cupino Ltd. & Anr., 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 791 (Bombay High Court)
• Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2022) SCC OnLine Del 4240 (Delhi High Court)
• S. Rajan v. M/s. Nanjundamma, (2007) 3 Kant LJ 37 (Karnataka High Court)

D.  Law Commission Reports

• Law Commission of India, 246th Report on 'Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996' (August 2014)
• Law Commission of India, 176th Report on 'The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2001' (2001)

E.  International Instruments

• UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), as amended in 2006 — Articles 17 to 17J (Chapter IV-A: Interim Measures and Preliminary Orders)
• SIAC Arbitration Rules, 2016 — Schedule 1 (Emergency Arbitration Procedure)
• ICC Rules of Arbitration 2021 — Article 29 and Appendix V (Emergency Arbitrator Rules)
• LCIA Arbitration Rules 2020 — Article 9B (Emergency Arbitrator)
• DIAC Rules 2022 — Article 43 (Emergency Arbitrator)

F.  Academic References

• O.P. Malhotra, The Law & Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation (3rd Ed., LexisNexis, 2014)
• Indu Malhotra, Commentary on the Law of Arbitration (4th Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2020)
• P.C. Markanda, Law Relating to Arbitration and Conciliation (9th Ed., LexisNexis, 2016)
• Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd Ed., Kluwer Law International, 2021) — Chapter 17 (Provisional Measures in International Arbitration)
• Redfern & Hunter on International Arbitration (6th Ed., Oxford University Press, 2015) — Chapter 7 (Conservatory and Provisional Measures)
• Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th Ed., 2015)

G.  Statutory Materials & Parliamentary Debates

• Statement of Objects and Reasons, Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2015 (Rajya Sabha)
• Statement of Objects and Reasons, Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2018 (which became the 2019 Act)
• Report of the High-Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India (Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee), 2017

Disclaimer

This article is intended for academic and professional informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Practitioners should independently verify the current state of statutory provisions and judicial decisions before advising clients.